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Abstract 
In this paper an interest group model of rent seeking behaviour between sugarcane farmers and 
environmental protectionists is developed. The motivation for this scenario comes from the debate over 
fertilizer run-off and its possible impact on Queensland’s Great Barrier Reef. The paper takes Gordon 
Tullock’s rent-seeking model and applies it to the bargaining process over controls on fertilizer 
application in an effort to learn something about the likely political outcomes of this debate. 
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1 Introduction 
Current interest in eutrophication of the barrier reef and the possible impact of 
agricultural run-off on the reef and the reef lagoon is very high. The issue has received 
wide media exposure and has generated a government inquiry and a number of consulting 
reports. Contrasting with the wide public and scientific interest in the issue economic 
analysis of the problem has been limited. Exceptions include Beard (2002), Millen 
(2003)1,  Hall (2005)2 and Brough and Beard (2006).  
 
Given the politically controversial nature of the topic a public choice approach seems a 
logical way of tackling at least some aspects of the problem. The idea of treating 
canefarmers and environmentalists as interest-groups lobbying government for particular 
political outcomes seems to capture the spirit of the current political controversy and to 
provide a means in which to analyze the likely success of the current policy debate from 
the perspective of the new political economy. 
 
Rent-seeking models of interest group behaviour date back to Tullock (1980). 
Surprisingly there has been little application of rent-seeking approach to environmental 
lobbying. Exceptions include Damania (1999) and Brooks and Heijdra (1987) as well as 
Migue and Marceau (1993). This approach has however been widely applied to 
international trade (Damania (1999), see for example Hillmann and Ursprung (1988) and 
has been applied to public goods by Ursprung (1990). 
 
This is despite the widespread political lobbying one sees over the trade-offs between 
private sector interests and the public good nature of the environment. In Australia, 
confrontation between the agricultural lobby and the environmental lobby although not 
the norm has arisen on a number issues: 
 
                                                 
1
 University of Queensland Honours thesis 2003. 
2
 University of Queensland Honours thesis 2005. 
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1. agricultural run-off from cane farms in north Queensland. 
2. tree-clearing in Queensland. 
3. salinization in the Murray-Darling basin. 
 
Although in the latter case the degree of confrontation is not as sever as in the first two.  
Tree clearing and the eutrophication issue have been particularly characterized by 
confrontation rather than by constructively working towards co-operative solutions. 
 
It is therefore surprising that this approach has apparently not been applied to the analysis 
of lobbying behaviour that is observed in relation to the environmental issues mentioned 
above.  Tullocks theory of efficient rent seeking provides one means of shedding light on 
this behaviour and perhaps of making some prediction as to the likely outcomes. 
 
In this paper a model of political lobbying on the part of canegrowers and 
environmentalists is presented and the impact of restrictions on fertilizer application on 
the likelihood of obtaining the desired political outcome of each interest group is 
presented. The issue is chosen to highlight the two extremes of views on what one might 
do about reducing nutrient run-off from cane farms. It is not suggested that imposing a 
quota on fertilizer application is a realistic option, rather this particular policy instrument 
provides a means of elucidating what impact economic factors may have on political 
lobbying between the sugar industry and the environmental movement.  In section 2 the 
model is presented, section 3 discusses the Nash equilibrium of the lobbying game, 
section 4 political economy issues in bush electorates and section 5 concludes. 
2 The Model 
In the model environmental quality is treated as a public good. Farmers however do not 
benefit from the public good. Environmentalists alone benefit from the public good 
“environment”. Farmers benefit from expenditure on fertilizer but this reduces the overall 
quantity of public good available. The environmental lobby wishes to reduce fertilizer 
levels to a minimal target level. So that farmers maximize expected profit over the 
optimal fertilizer level and the minimal level of fertilizer application. Likewise farmers 
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attempt to maximize expected utility across optimal and minimal fertilizer application 
levels. The model can be conceived of as a multi-stage game. In the first stage of the 
game politicians propose a policy measure in the form of a restriction on fertiliser 
application. Comparative static results of this decision are presented. In a second stage of 
the game an electoral contest (via political lobbying) occurs between politicians 
associated with particular interest groups (producers opposed to the restriction on 
fertiliser application and consumers in favour of the restriction). Once the outcome of the 
election is known producers and consumers make appropriate production and 
consumption decisions in a third stage of the game. The model is solved via backwards 
induction. Firms (farmers) make production decisions and households (consumers) make 
consumption decisions. Farms are assumed to generate a non-point source pollutant 
which is detrimental to a public good environmental quality and consequently diminishes 
consumer welfare. In the second stage both farmers and consumers lobby regarding the 
imposition of a possibly policy measure that will penalize farmers in an effort to reduce 
the extent of environmental damage that is induced by farming activity. 
 
 The farmer’s profit maximizing problem is given by: 
 
( ) ( ) LcxLxccspxx θθα −=Πmax  
 
where ( ) ( ) 578.04009.0 +−= ccspccsp s is the price of cane according to the cane pricing 
formula and sp is the pool price of sugar. CCS is a measure of the sugar content of cane 
in percent. x is the fertilizer application rate per hectare. θ is the proportion of total land 
area assigned to sugar cane and L is the total land area. 
 
The optimal rate of fertilizer application is then given by: 
( )
1
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Note that assigned land are has no direct impact on fertilizer application rate in this 
formulation of the model. 
 
In the second-stage farmers choose lobbying effort by maximizing the expected benefits 
of unrestricted application of fertilizer and restricted application of fertilizer. So that 
expected profit is given by: 
 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]iRRRi expexpE −ΠΠ+−ΠΠ=Π || ***                                                                (2) 
where: 
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Environmentalists choose private and public good consumption in the first-stage of the 
decision process and then lobbying effort in the second stage. 
 
Environmentalists choose lobbying effort by maximizing the expected utility from 
consumption of both public and private goods defined over two-states of the world one in 
which fertilizer application is unrestricted and one in which it is restricted. Thus 
environmentalists utility in the first stage is given by 
 
( ) βα zczcU ii =,                                                                                                    (4) 
and they face the transformation curve between private goods ic  and a public good 
z representing environmental quality: 
 
zpcB i +=                                                                                                          (5) 
Where B is the maximum production of z when production of private goods is zero. 
Rearranging and substituting 
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The following Utility function is obtained 
 
( ) β
α
zz
pp
B
zcU ii 





−=
1
,                                                                                       (6) 
 
The optimal household consumption of the public good environmental quality is then 
given by 
 
Bz βα
β
+
=0                                                                                                   (7) 
 
The idea behind the multi-stage game is that each interest group is precommitted to a 
particular position before lobbying begins.  
 
 In the unrestricted state of the world the public good environmental quality z is set to the 
minimum level. This done by setting ∑
=
−=
n
i
ixzz
1
*
0 where 0z  is the consumers preferred 
or desired level of public good. In the restricted state of the world one sets 
( )∑
=
−
−=
n
i
Ri xxzz
1
*
0 , , where Rx is the restricted level of fertilizer application. 
 
From this we then obtain the expected utility of the environmentalist: 
 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]jRRRjj lUxUplUxUpEU −+−= || ***                                                              (8) 
 
where: 
( )
∑∑
∑
==
=
+
=
m
j
j
n
i
i
n
j
j
le
l
xUp
11
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Are the probabilities that farmers will be successful in their lobbying effort and 
unsuccessful in their lobbying effort respectively. 
3 N-Player Symmetric Nash Equilibrium of the Lobbying Game 
 
The results in this section for N-player symmetric Nash equilibrium are well known in 
the literature on rent-seeking, however the details differ depending on the specifics of 
particular models. 
 
Utilizing the results of the previous section, on substituting in and assuming symmetry 
one obtains the following 
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Assuming symmetry one obtains 
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Maximizing this under the assumption of symmetry to find: 
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Solving for e and assuming e to be non-negative one obtains: 
 
( ) ( )
n
nmlml
le
RΠΠ+−
=
−*
                                                                                 (12) 
 
Which will be non-negative if ( ) mln R ≥ΠΠ −* . 
 
Similarly the reaction function of the environmentalists to lobbying by farmers can be 
derived. Assuming symmetry the objective function of the environmentalists is given by: 
 
[ ] [ ]lU
mlne
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
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+
−+−
+
= 1*                                                           (13) 
 
Maximizing this with respect to l gives: 
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                                         (14) 
 
From this one obtains only one positive real valued reaction function for the 
environmentalists: 
 
( ) ( )
m
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R *
−+−
=                                                                                (15) 
 
 
Proposition 1: The unique symmetric Nash equilibria of the lobbying game is given by 
( )( )
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Proof (see appendix of Hillmann and Ursprung (1988)) 
 
Note that depending on the level of restrictions imposed on fertilizer application a 
number of different equilibria result: 
 
Proposition 2: If Rxx <*  (unrestrictive legislation) then 0* =l  and 0* =e  
Proof 
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Note that because in a profit maximum marginal revenue equals marginal costs the 
marginal profit terms in the denominator of both equations reduce to zero, which then 
gives the result. 
 
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Note that the optimal lobbying effort in this case is independent of the restriction imposed 
on fertilizer application. In the case in which legislation is unrestrictive clearly 
canegrowers and environmentalists will not regard this as an issue. It takes a political 
party to run with the issue in order for either interest group to devote effort to lobbying. 
 
Proposition 3: If Rxx >*  (restrictive legislation) then  
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Proof 
After substitution and simplification the result is immediately obvious. 
 
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This result will be utilized in what follows and is shown here for purposes of comparison. 
 
4 Factors Contributing to the Political Success of Each Lobby 
 
Politicians are assumed in this type of model to maximize the probability of electoral 
success. That is a politician will maximize the probability of their particular agenda 
winning by choosing the level of restriction on fertilizer application. In case I politicians 
will have no impact at all on the electorate with this issue and would regard the whole 
issue of eutrophication of the barrier reef and restricting the level of fertilizer application 
in the sugar industry as a political non-issue. In case II however some political mileage 
could be gained from the issue by maximizing the probability of electoral success by 
choosing a more or less restrictive level of fertilizer application. 
4.1 Rural Electorate 
 
In the case in which the legislation is restrictive the behaviour of a self-interested 
politician becomes interesting.  A self-interested politician will attempt to maximize the 
probability of re-election given unrestricted application of fertilizer by farmers by 
choosing a cap on fertilizer application Rx . To find an analytical solution  for Rx  appears 
difficult, however that does not mean that no conclusions can be drawn about the 
behaviour of politicians.  In the case in which the legislation is restrictive rational 
behaviour on the part of a self-interested ``conservative ‘’politician implies that an 
increase in the efforts of the green lobby would reduce the lobbying effort of cane 
growers: 
Proposition 4: 0<
∂
∂
l
e
 
Proof 
A self-interested politician will attempt to maximize the probability of re-election given 
unrestricted application of fertilizer by farmers by choosing a cap on fertilizer application 
Rx : 
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Rearranging, one obtains: 
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 
 
The implication is clear cane farmers are able to free-ride off the political conservatism of 
local members. Urban greens lobbying of conservative rural politicians is not likely to be 
effective. 
 
Differentiating the lobbying effort of consumers with respect to the cap on fertilizer 
according to the ration rule of calculus, it is clear that one only need evaluate the 
numerator of ( )Rxl '  to determine the sign marginal lobbying effort. To see this clearly, it 
is easier to evaluate the numerator of ( )Rxl '  using the Nash equilibrium condition 
( )( )
( ) ( )[ ]2**
2**
*
UUmn
UUnml
RR
RR
−+Π−Π
−Π−Π
= .  
This leads to the following lemma: 
 
Lemma: ( )Rxl '  is either positive or zero 
Proof 
The proof proceeds by way of proof by contradiction. So we will assume first that the 
lemma is incorrect and then argue to a contradiction. First however, differentiating  
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( )Rxl *  with respect to Rx  one obtains for the numerator of ( )Rxl ' : 
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Now note the following RΠ−Π=∆Π *  and *UUU R −=∆ , also note that both these 
terms will be positive because restricting fertilizer reduces profits of farmers and 
increases utility of consumers. This also means that 0<
∂
Π∂
R
R
x
and 0>
∂
∂
R
R
x
U
. This means 
we are able with some effort to sign the numerator of marginal consumer lobby effort.  
 
Inspection of the numerator indicates at first sight that the sign of ( )Rxl '  is indeterminate, 
however on closer inspection and with some rearranging of the equation one obtains the 
condition for the numerator to be negative: 
0<numerator is given by 
( ) [ ] [ ]
( ) ( )22
2
22
2
U
x
U
mU
x
n
Umn
x
UUmnU
x
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
∆∆Π
∂
∂
+∆∆Π
∂
Π∂
−<
∆+∆Π
∂
∂∆Π+∆+∆Π∆
∂
Π∂
−
 
This implies that both [ ] ∆Π<∆+∆Π nUmn 2  and [ ] ( )2UmUmn ∆<∆+∆Π .  
This means that ∆Π<∆ nUm and that ∆Πn adds to the total additive gain to consumers 
from restricting fertilizer Um∆ will be less than the multiplicative gain U∆ . The first of 
these conditions implies that in aggregate producers gain more from a liberal policy than 
consumers gain from a restrictive policy or alternatively producers would lose more than 
consumers would gain from capping fertilizer application. Under these circumstances a 
green politicians chances of election would be maximized if consumers expanded 
lobbying efforts and producers reduced lobbying efforts. However the gain to producers 
from the liberal policy must be less than the increase in utility per person that consumers 
would get from a restrictive policy. The total loss to producers cannot both be more than 
what consumers gain as a group and less than what an individual consumer gains, this is a 
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contradiction. Consequently it can be concluded that the numerator is non-negative and 
that the sign of ( )Rxl '  is either positive or zero. 
 
 
In a similar manner to the argument employed in proposition 4 the rational behaviour on 
the part of a self-interested but green politician in a rural electorate implies that an 
increase in green lobbying will lead to an increase in the lobbying effort of cane farmers:  
Proposition 5: 0≥
∂
∂
l
e
 
 Proof  
First note that we also assume Rxx >* .  Now consider that 
( ) −=Π 1| RR xp ( ) ( )( ) ( )RR
R
xmlxne
xne
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+
−=Π 1| ** . 
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which implies 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
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or 
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( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
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nxmlxnexl
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+
−
+
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2
'
'
 
This will be negative if ( ) 0' <Rxl .  By the above lemma this is not the case. 
 
 
The result is unstable lobbying competition in rural electorates for rural green candidates. 
If one consider rural electorates in Queensland proposition 4 implies that urban green 
consumer groups are likely to have little impact on conservative politicians in the bush, 
which is not surprising. Proposition 5, implies a lobbying war between different parties 
for more environmentally minded candidates in the bush. The theory of rent-seeking 
would view this as a case in which rents are completely dissipated. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
This paper applies Tullock (1980)’s model of rent-seeking to the problem of 
environmental lobbying for a hypothetical restriction on fertilizer application rates in 
Queensland sugar-cane electorates bordering the Great Barrier Reef region. The paper 
verifies a number of well-known results on Nash equilibria in rent seeking games before 
proceeding to analyse the consequences of restrictions on fertilizer application rates on 
poltical behaviour in rural electorates. In particular, the possible impact of urban green 
lobby groups on bush politics is examined and it is shown that the presence of green 
candidates in bush electorates would lead to a lobbying war and consequent high levels of 
rent dissipation. 
 
The model can easily be extended to study political lobbying behaviour in urban 
electorates and this would be interesting to do for purposes of comparison. A further 
extension would be to try and determine the level of fertilizer application that would 
maximise each politician chances of electoral success. However, this would require 
numerical analysis and is a non-trivial exercise. 
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